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I. INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time, Enlightenment ideals prevailed across the
land. Neutrality, objectivity, and reason were accepted as the firma-
ments of Supreme Court decisionmaking. "Americans tend[ed] to
believe that 'playing fair' [meant] making everyone play by the same
rules, and any deviation from this definition [was] immediately sus-
pect."' But "then, some scholars.., abandoned the fundamental as-
piration toward. . . neutrality in government."2 "Neutrality" came to
be "considered a chimera, an illusion used by those in power to justify
and perpetuate existing hierarchies." 3 The nation was threatened
with a return to pre-Enlightenment days, a "return to a world in
which it matters not what is said, but who says it," 4 "where objectivity
is replaced by power."5
This is the story Professor Suzanna Sherry tells about the time
of the Rehnquist Court. In All the Supreme Court Really Needs to
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I would like to thank the following col-
leagues for comments on drafts of this Comment or for discussing with me the ideas contained
in it: Rebecca Brown, John Goldberg, Laura Kalman, Suzanna Sherry, Nancy Staudt, and Nick
Zeppos. Thanks also to James Rowan for dedicated research assistance. The Vanderbilt
University Research Council has contributed generously to the historical research upon which I
relied in preparing this paper; for that continued support I am grateful.
1. Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme Court Really Needs to Know It Learned from the
Warren Court, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 459, 481 (1997).
2. Id. at 482.
3. Id. at 477.
4. Id. at 484.
5. Id. at 486.
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Know It Learned from the Warren Court, Professor Sherry argues that
some academics have unfairly called the Rehnquist Court
conservative for adhering to the very same values of neutrality and
objectivity advanced by that "beacon of [liberalism]," the Warren
Court.6  According to Professor Sherry, two groups of scholars
threaten these ideals. First, there are those who would replace the
decisionmaking ideal of "[flormal neutrality" with the conflicting idea
of "substantive neutrality or equality of results." Second, and even
worse, are some scholars, "commonly called postmodernists or social
constructivists," who attack the very idea of neutrality.8 These
scholars "have abandoned the fundamental aspiration
toward.., neutrality in government,"9 which "explains the[ir]
condemnation of the current Supreme Court: its adherence to
principles of neutrality places it squarely among those committed to
perpetuating existing hierarchies of power."10
One of Professor Sherry's particular targets is affirmative
action. According to Professor Sherry, the Warren Court pursued a
policy of race neutrality, insisting that race play no part in
governmental decisionmaking.11 Such neutrality was a step forward
at the time, Professor Sherry explains, but it failed to eliminate all
barriers to full racial equality, and so some scholars "began to demand
different remedies-remedies that would transgress the command of
formal neutrality" in favor of "equality of results."12  Although
Professor Sherry does not come down squarely against affirmative
action, she considers any argument for substantive neutrality to be
difficult to justify because it would deviate from the widely-held norm
of formal neutrality. 3 She saves particular criticism for those who
"have begun to attack the idea of neutrality altogether."14
What is intriguing about Professor Sherry's story is that with
just one difference, it is very nearly the same story that could be told
about the years of the Warren Court. Some scholars during that time,
purporting to represent the mainstream of opinion, extolled the val-
ues of reason, neutrality, and objectivity, viewing them as bedrock
6. Id. at 483.
7. Id. at 478.
8. Id. at 481.
9. Id. at 482-83.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 477.
12. Id. at 478.
13. See id. at 481-82.
14. Id. at 482. Professor Sherry continues: "It has become fashionable to assert that
doctrines of neutrality are not simply ineffective in combating racial injustice, but pernicious
and intentionally discriminatory" Id.
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principles of law. 15 What Professor Sherry does not explain, however,
is that these "neutral" scholars were attacking the Warren Court, not
defending it. The work of the Warren Court was defended by other
scholars, who felt that it was the substantive equality of results
rather than the formal neutrality of rules that mattered.16 Moreover,
some of the Warren Court defenders-like the scholars Professor
Sherry criticizes today-also suggested that neutrality and adherence
to principled reasoning were an illusion meant only to preserve
existing power hierarchies and to subordinate minority interests.
17
The fact that Professor Sherry could tell very nearly the same
story about today's debate as could be told about the debate over the
Warren Court suggests that it would be profitable to revisit that ear-
lier debate. Professor Herbert Wechsler's famous paper, Toward
Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law, delivered in 1958, is in a
sense what kicked off all the earlier debate about neutrality in
Supreme Court decisionmaking. 18  Professor Sherry states that by
insisting on "neutrality" she does not mean to invoke "anything so
grand as Herbert Wechsler's 'neutral principles.' "19 Professor
Sherry's modesty aside, however, her paper and Professor Wechsler's
do bear similarity.20
A retrospective look at the neutral principles debate over the
Warren Court suggests that Professor Sherry overstates some of the
historical claims she seems to be making. This retrospective demon-
strates that, contrary to Professor Sherry's views, the Warren Court's
defenders emphasized substantive results over formal neutrality. The
defenders' operative concern was not to assure colorblind laws but to
eliminate legal structures that permitted the majority to subordinate
a racial minority.2' To the extent that formal neutrality posed a
barrier to this substantive agenda, Warren Court defenders
15. See notes 60-97 and accompanying text.
16. See notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
17. See notes 116-34 and accompanying text.
18. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev.
1 (1959). The lecture was later published in a collection of selected essays. Herbert Wechsler,
Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law (Harvard U., 1961). The fuss over Wechsler's lec-
tures had its origins in intellectual thought tracing back to the Realist challenge to law's neu-
trality. See Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence 271-72 (Clarendon Press, 1995);
Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal
Orthodoxy 5-6 (Oxford U., 1992). See also Parts II.A and II.B (discussing the roots of the
neutral principles debate).
19. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 477 (cited in note 1).
20. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
21. See notes 71-85 and accompanying text.
505
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
challenged the very concept of neutrality as "an illusion" or as
unhelpful to resolving disputes over constitutional values.2
This retrospective can also lead to a more sophisticated
discussion about the value and importance of formal neutrality in
constitutional decisionmaking. Some political scientists of the
Warren Court era took a studied posture to the entire neutral princi-
ples debate, trying to understand what animated it.23 One conclusion
was that "neutrality" is an important rhetorical approach, one that
strikes a chord in the body politic, thus giving credence to Professor
Sherry's broader position.24 But students of that era also concluded
that, ultimately, what matters most to the public is the basic justice
of the results reached in individual cases, not the rhetoric that
explains those results.25
This retrospective has particular implications for affirmative
action. Professor Sherry's story suggests skepticism about affirmative
action; she uses history to put the burden of proof on those who would
justify it. As this retrospective suggests, however, matters are not
quite so simple. Professor Sherry explains that one reason the
Rehnquist Court may be considered conservative is its refusal to
"extend the trendlines established by Warren Court precedent."26
That observation, amply supported by history, at least raises difficult
questions about where the burden of proof over affirmative action
should rest. If Rehnquist Court decisions are, indeed, a refusal to
"extend the trendlines," then perhaps it is the Rehnquist Court deci-
sions that are deviant and require reasoned justification.27
This debate warrants a personal caveat at the outset. It is
difficult to be against reason and neutrality, and I am not. It is dan-
gerous to say that right decisions are necessarily those with popular
support, and I am not. But the very same spirit that animates rea-
son's enduring appeal to the courts, to the public, and to the academy,
requires that any appeal to reason not be over-simplified, that histori-
cal concerns be kept straight, and that concerns about privileging
22. See notes 116-34 and accompanying text.
23. See Part II.D.
24. See notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
25. See notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
26. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 479 (cited in note 1).
27. Professor Sherry does say that "[mI]any of those who support affirmative action-that
is, proponents of some version of substantive equality-are trying to extend the trendliness
established by Warren Court precedent, in the face of changed circumstances." Id. (cited in note
1) (emphasis added). If Professor Sherry were correct about the "changed circumstances," that
might have some further implication as to where the burden of proof rests. But circumstances
have not changed, which is precisely the problem. If the goal is racial equality, Professor Sherry
herself recognizes that "principles of neutrality failed to produce desired results." Id.
506 [Vol. 50:503
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formal neutrality not be dismissed too easily. Today's challengers to
the idea of neutrality may be out of bounds in some ways,28 but their
arguments carry force-at least historically-in others.
II. THE DEBATE OVER NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES
A. The Genesis of the Neutral Principles Debate
Brown v. Board of Education,9 decided on May 17, 1954, may
fairly be regarded as the first significant act of the Warren Court.
30 It
played to immediate and widespread applause. Most of the country
hailed Brown for its egalitarian result, and commentary at the time
regularly noted racial segregation's incongruity with the broader
promise of democracy. 31 Many saw the decision as particularly useful
for removing a blot on the United States's ability to combat the com-
munist threat.32
Not all reviews of Brown were positive, however; the decision
was met with catcalls and threats of defiance as well. Some of the
criticisms academics advanced in later years about Brown and the
Warren Court bore a remarkable similarity to segregationist
complaints at the time of the decision itself. Many of those attacking
28. Surely this is true regarding the anti-Semitism that Professor Sherry and her co-
author Daniel Farber find in some of the outsider scholarship. See Daniel A. Farber and
Suzanna Sherry, Beyond All Reason: Radical Multiculturalism, Law, and Anti-Semitism
(forthcoming 1997).
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 4-8 (Harper &
Row, 1970) (arguing that Brown represented the first sharp break with the Vinson Court).
31. Michael Klarman has argued persuasively that Brown's countermajoritarian nature is
greatly exaggerated-an assessment with which I agree. Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 19-21 (1996).
32. Professor Sherry singles out for criticism Derrick Bell's "interest convergence" argu-
ment that Brown outlawed school segregation only when doing so converged with the interests
of the majority. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 483 (cited in note 1). As part of his argument,
Professor Bell explained that "the decision helped provide immediate credibility to America's
struggle with Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging third world
peoples." Derrick A- Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 524 (1980). News accounts of the time bear out Professor Bell's
argument; indeed, the argument is persuasively developed in full in Mary L. Dudziak,
Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 61 (1988) (asserting that the
consensus against racial segregation in the 1950s resulted from the convergence of interests of
whites and persons of color). See also Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil
Rights Movement, 80 Va. L. Rev. 7, 26-29 (1994). Klarman's article situates Brown within the
entire fabric of changing attitudes about race in America.
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Brown made claims that the decision represented naked power
politics by the Supreme Court, which had abandoned proper
constitutional forms. "The South," proclaimed Senator James
Eastland of Mississippi, "will [neither] abide by nor obey this
legislative decision by a political court."33 A Manifesto of Ninety-Six
Members of Congress accused the Court of substituting its "personal,
political and social ideas for the established law of the land" and
decried the decision as "naked power" and "naked judicial power."34
Although the ugly vehemence of these remarks is troubling, the
juxtaposition of "naked power" with judicial propriety mirrors the
neutral principles debate of both judicial generations.
Complaints that the Supreme Court had abandoned its judicial
role to engage in power politics were not unique to the time immedi-
ately following Brown; they would plague the Warren Court through-
out its tenure. In 1958, the Conference of Chief Justices, in a sharply
critical report commenting on many of the Supreme Court's decisions
not dealing with race, accused the Court of exercising "almost unlim-
ited policy-making powers."35 Speaking in the midst of a heated con-
gressional and national furor over whether to strip the Court of juris-
diction in cases involving communists or otherwise to modify Court
decisions, Senator Jenner of Illinois suggested that judicial review
was being used "as a device for conforming the law to what the indi-
vidual members of the Court, or a majority of them, think the law
should be. In the latter case, judicial review is being used to promote
a judicial oligarchy, and is bringing us far closer to a government of
men and not of laws."36 In 1965, following the turmoil that arose after
the school prayer 37 and reapportionment38 decisions, a publication for
33. William S. White, Ruling to Figure in '54 Campaign: Decision Tied to
Eisenhower-Russell Leads Southerners in Criticism of Court, N.Y. Times 1 (May 18, 1954).
34. Text of 96 Congressmen's Declaration on Integration, N.Y. Times 19 (Mar. 12, 1956).
See also Southern Manifesto, 102 Cong. Rec. 4460 (1956).
One federal judge even called the Supreme Court a "hierarchy of despotic judges" and
accused it of discriminating against white citizens. U.S. Judge in South Assails High Court,
N.Y. Times 6 (July 26, 1957) (comment of George Bell Timmerman, Sr., Federal District Judge
of South Carolina). Apparently anticipating Wechsler's argument, Senator Sam Ervin of North
Carolina said the Courts segregation decisions violated "the freedom to select one's associates.
Whenever Americans are at liberty to choose their own associates, they virtually always select
within their own race." Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The Case for Segregation, Look 32 (Apr. 3, 1956).
35. What 36 State Chief Justices Said About the Supreme Court, U.S. News & World
Report 92 (Oct. 3, 1958). See also Conference of Chief Justices, Report of Committee on Federal-
State Relationships as Affected by Judicial Decisions (August, 1958), printed in 104 Cong. Rec.
A7782 (1958).
36. 104 Cong. Rec. 18,641 (Aug. 20, 1958).
37. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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students called Senior Scholastic published an article entitled The
Supreme Court... Guardian or Dictator of the Nation's Laws?39
Although the foaming cries of rabid segregationists might have been
dismissed easily, by the time the furor was over the Court could count
among its critics many members of the American Bar Association,
many members of Congress, and many state Supreme Court Chief
Justices.40
In light of the identity of the Court's critics and the tenor of
their criticism, academic critics stayed mute for some time after
Brown, and when critical, they approached the task with delicacy.
Erwin Griswold, Dean of the Harvard Law School, explained: "With
such a hue and cry being raised, one should be very careful that he
does not join it, and that he does not create the impression that he is
joining it."41 In a later article, he elaborated, "[a]nything [a critic]
may write is susceptible to misuse by such irresponsible critics of the
Court and its work."42 Phillip Kurland, a Professor of Law at the
University of Chicago, rose to defend the work of the state Supreme
Court Chief Justices whose report he had helped draft. He worried
that the report "gave aid and comfort to the enemy.... It was the
warm greetings of brotherhood from the Southern demagogues and
the paeans of praise from the American witch-hunting fraternity that
did the harm."43  He might have added that releasing the report
amidst the Little Rock controversy that resulted in Cooper v. Aaron44
had not helped.
If the ice was to be broken in polite circles, no one was better
suited to do so than Learned Hand, "the most revered of living
American judges." 45 Eighty-seven years old in February of 1958, he
"was called ' 46 to the Harvard Law School to give the prestigious
Holmes Lectures, an event whose attendance rivaled a major theater
38. See, for example, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
39. The Supreme Court... Guardian or Dictator of the Nation's Laws?, Senior Scholastic
6 (Mar. 4, 1965).
40. See notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
41. Erwin N. Griswold, Morrison Lectures, 43 Mass. L. Q. 98, 101 (1958).
42. Erwin N. Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term-Foreword: Of Time and
Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 82 (1960).
43. Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court and Its Judicial Critics, 6 Utah L. Rev. 457,
459 (1959).
44. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
45. Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge 653 (Knopf, 1994).
46. J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84
Harv. L. Rev. 769, 769 (1971).
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opening. Judge Hand's appearance came amidst fury at some of the
Supreme Court's decisions in cases involving communists. Southern
segregationists had stood alone since Brown, but with recent civil
liberties decisions limiting state and federal witch-hunting activities,
the segregationists had finally found an issue calculated to attract
broader national condemnation of the Supreme Court.47  Learned
Hand, as it turned out, was sharply critical of the Supreme Court's
activism, a fact that turned the heads of the Court's admirers.
"Warren Court admirers could dismiss the most vocal critics of the
Court as extremists; yet here was the nation's most highly regarded
judge, renowned as the most articulate advocate of liberty, apparently
joining the Court's enemies. 48
Context helps to illuminate how this revered judge of generally
liberal ideals came to be criticizing the Warren Court. Learned Hand
was an old-guard progressive. He had fought the battle in favor of
progressive legislation against the Old Court,49 a battle that was not
won until the defeat of that Court amidst the furor over President
Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing plan.50 Learned Hand and other
progressives had attacked the Old Court repeatedly for using the
Constitution, particularly the Due Process Clause, to strike
progressive legislation.51 Given his part, Learned Hand could not
reconcile criticizing courts for invalidating economic legislation, while
approving their using those same clauses to strike laws in the name of
civil or personal rights.52 Any such interference with the operations of
legitimate democratic government constituted the Supreme Court, in
Learned Hand's view, as a "third legislative chamber."53
47. See J. Patrick White, The Warren Court Under Attack: The Role of the Judiciary in a
Democratic Society, 19 Md. L. Rev. 181, 189 (1958) Southern Congressmen, having failed in
their initial effort to mobilize anti-Court sentiment... were quick to perceive that their basic
purpose of discrediting the Supreme Court would be served whether the issue was undue
concern for civil liberties or softness to communism or states' rights.").
48. Gunther, Learned Hand at 655 (cited in note 45).
49. See Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 495
(1908). On Hand's involvement in Progressive Era politics, see, for example, Gunther, Learned
Hand at 202-69 (cited in note 45).
50. See Gunther, Learned Hand at 459-60 (cited in note 45). The question of whether
Justice Roberts's famous switch was in response to FDR's Court-packing plan is contested, but I
stand with those who think that widespread popular attacks on the Court apparently influenced
the Supreme Coures general turnaround. See Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal
Liberalism 349 n.70 (Yale U., 1996).
51. See Thomas Reed Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum-Wage Legislation, 37 Harv. L.
Rev. 545 (1924); T.W. Brown, Due Process of Law, 32 Am. L. Rev. 14, 20-21 (1898).
52. Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 46 (Harvard U., 1958).
53. Id. at 42. Judge Hand expressed his disapproval of such a system in no uncertain
terms. "For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if
I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not." Id. at 73.
510 [Vol. 50:503
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Although Learned Hand's main point of criticism was the exer-
cise of activist judicial review in general, he also took Brown to task.54
Learned Hand's original inclination had probably been to support
Brown, but his correspondence with Supreme Court Justice Felix
Frankfurter suggests that heavy lobbying by Justice Frankfurter
about the decision's rationale ultimately led Learned Hand to attack
Brown.55 In the end, Learned Hand concluded that like other judicial
decisions he had criticized, Brown was nothing but an illegitimate
"coup de main.."56
After Learned Hand threw down the gauntlet, the way was
clear for further academic criticism of the Supreme Court and of
Brown. Herbert Wechsler, the Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Law
at Columbia University,57 accepted the challenge in his own Holmes
Lectures a year later. Unlike Learned Hand, Professor Wechsler was
prepared to accept a role for judicial review. This, Wechsler felt,
followed from Article III and from the decision in Marbury v.
Madison:58 the Court could not shirk its duty to decide constitutional
questions thrust upon it.59 That duty, however, only raised the ques-
tion of what standard the Court was to apply, a question Wechsler
was forced to answer although Learned Hand had not.
It is here that Professor Wechsler developed his famous argu-
ment for "neutral principles." In order to separate court processes
from "the ad hoc in politics," Wechsler said, the judicial process must
be "genuinely principled, resting with every respect to every step that
is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite
54. Id. at 55.
55. Gunther, Learned Hand 665-66 (cited in note 45). According to Learned Hand's
biographer Gerald Gunther, Hand was sympathetic to Brown. Although skeptical of the Brown
Court's rationale, which seemed to be limited to the special rule of education, Learned Hand felt
he could have supported the decision on the ground that "racial equality was a value that must
prevail against any conflicting interest." Id. at 666. But Justice Frankfurter could not accept
this rationale, reluctant as he was to be boxed into striking down state anti-miscegenation laws
on the very same ground, a result he did not believe the country would tolerate. Id. at 666-67.
56. See Hand, The Bill of Rights at 55 (cited in note 52). On Learned Hand's struggle with
the Brown decision, see Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law at 259 (cited in note 18);
Gunther, Learned Hand at 671 (cited in note 45); Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal
Liberalism at 33-34 (cited in note 50).
57. Professor Wechsler's professional chair was more than a little ironic in light of the
tension over the rationale in Brown. After Professor Wechsler's speech, the neutral principle
advanced most often to justify Brown was a rationale based essentially on Justice Stone's
famous footnote four in his decision in Carolene Products. United States v. Carolene Products,
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4. (1938). See notes 71-85 and accompanying text.
58. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
59. Wechsler, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 3-10 (cited in note 18).
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transcending the immediate result that is achieved."60 "[Miust they
not," Wechsler asked, "decide on grounds of adequate neutrality and
generality, tested not only by the instant of application but by others
that the principles imply?"61 "[]s not the relative compulsion of the
language of the Constitution, of history and precedent-where they do
not combine to make an answer clear-itself a matter to be judged, so
far as possible, by neutral principles-by standards that transcend
the case at hand?"62 Wechsler's concern was to distinguish a court of
law from "a naked power organ."63
This emphasis on "neutral principles" that "transcend the case
at hand" seems nothing more and nothing less than what Professor
Sherry asks of the Supreme Court. Professor Wechsler, as will be
clear from his position on Brown, insisted only that the principle in a
case-the rule of a case-not differ depending upon the identity or
interest of the plaintiff. According to Professor Wechsler, it was
essential that a court employ a rule of decision that treated alike the
claims of a "labor union or a taxpayer, a Negro or a segregationist, a
corporation or a Communist."64 While disclaiming pretensions to
"anything so grand as Herbert Wechsler's 'neutral principles,' "65
Professor Sherry actually demonstrates her affinity by adopting the
sort of neutrality "represented by Justice O'Connor's insistence that
'the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not
dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by the
particular classification.' "66 All three seem to be insisting upon the
same sort of neutrality.
From the general statement about neutral principles, Professor
Wechsler turned to troubling cases, the most vexing of which was
Brown.67 Professor Wechsler professed to agree personally with the
result in Brown,68 but he simply could not explain it by the standard
of neutrality he had imposed. As Wechsler saw it, the decision was
60. Id. at 15.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 17.
63. Id. at 19.
64. Id. at 12.
65. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 477-78 (cited in note 1).
66. Id. at 461. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111, 132 L. Ed.
2d 158, 178 (1995) (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (quoting City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 494 (1989)). Here again, Justice O'Connor is simply making the judgment that laws
"benefiting" or "burdening" racial minorities are the same in a relevant way, such that the same
rule should apply.
67. "I would surely be engaged in playing Hamlet without Hamlet if I did not try to state





not about race, but about the right of association.69 Here, however,
neutral principles escaped him:
Given a situation where the state must practically choose between denying the
association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on those who would
avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for holding that the Constitution
demands that the claims for association should prevail? I should like to think
that there is, but I confess that I have not written the opinion. 70
B. A Neutral Principle, But Not "Colorblindness"
Although Herbert Wechsler could not write an opinion resolv-
ing Brown on neutral principles, many others were willing to do it for
him. Significantly, the "neutral" principle most often identified by
these other scholars was not that advanced by Professor Sherry and
adopted by the Supreme Court in its affirmative action decisions.
Professor Sherry argues that the legal legacy of Brown is the principle
of colorblindness or race neutrality,7 1 the very principle Justice
O'Connor ostensibly adopted for the Supreme Court in the recent
affirmative action decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.72
But those writing immediately after Wechsler typically saw Brown as
standing not for "colorblindness," but for the proposition that laws
were suspect if they discriminated against racial minorities-the
"antisubordination" principle73 This too is a neutral principle. It
finds ample support in footnote four of the Carolene Products decision,
69. Id. at 34.
70. Id.
71. See Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 463-64 (cited in note 1). There are those who doubt
that Brown really stood for a principle of race neutrality or indeed that such a principle would
make any sense. See Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence at 267 (cited in note 18).
The problem with this "principle" is that it no more justifies the decision in Brown than
it does the "separate-but-equar' formula which had been adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson.
The principle behind Brown, it may be assumed, not only upholds racial equality but
also denies the legitimacy of state-imposed racial segregation. The Warren Court failed,
in Brown, to articulate any such principle.
Id.
72. 115 S. Ct. 2097, 132 L. Ed. 2d. 158 (1995). I say "ostensibly" because, as discussed in
notes 184-92 and accompanying text, the Adarand Court did not discount the possibility of
employing race-conscious remedies. 115 S. Ct. at 2117-18. But see Girardeau A. Spann,
Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 How. L. J. 1, 84-85 (1995) (questioning the Adarand
majority's commitment to race-conscious remedies).
73. This is what Laurence Tribe refers to as the "antisubjugation" principle. Laurence A.
Tribe, Constitutional Law 1515 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988).
1997] 513
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
and it would call for a lower level of scrutiny in affirmative action
cases than that adopted by the Supreme Court.74
Louis Pollak's is perhaps the most famous "opinion" suggesting
that the Brown Court had adopted the antisubordination rationale. 75
Promising adherence to the idea of neutral principles advanced by
Professor Wechsler, then-Professor and later-Judge Pollak accepted
that "one who supports the judgment but confesses dissatisfaction
with the opinion rendered has some obligation to draft what he re-
gards as an adequate opinion," which he did.76 Although there are
hints of the colorblindness rationale in Pollak's draft "opinion," the
opinion rested primarily on the stigma caused by segregation imposed
by a dominant white majority.77 In support of this approach, Pollak
cited Carolene Products's footnote four, and he pointed to Justice
Stone's concern for "searching judicial inquiry into the legislative
judgment in situations where prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may tend to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied on to protect minorities."78
Although some commentators after Brown occasionally
referred to something akin to the colorblindness rationale,79 many
followed Pollak in resting Brown on the antisubordination principle.
"What, on the score of generality and neutrality," asked an
exasperated Alexander Bickel, "is wrong with the principle that a
legislative choice in favor of a freedom not to associate is forbidden,
when the consequence of such a choice is to place one of the groups of
which our society is constituted in a position of permanent,
74. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. This is the basis for John Hart Ely's famous
defense of the Warren Court decisions. John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse
Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723 (1974); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard
U., 1980). As Ira Heyman has pointed out, "Professor Wechsler's whole argument depends on
his refusal to consider that the Court might have based its decision on a determination that
Negroes are intentionally made to feel inferior through the mechanism of segregation"
Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence at 271-72 (cited in note 18) (quoting Ira Michael
Heyman, The Chief Justice, Racial Segregation, and the Friendly Critics, 49 Cal. L. Rev. 104,
112 (1961)).
75. Louis H. Pollack, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
76. Id. at 24.
77. Judge Pollak saw "little room for doubt that it is the function of Jim Crow laws to
make identification as a Negro a matter of stigma." Id. at 28.
78. Id. at 27 (quoting Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 606 (1940)
(Stone, J., dissenting)).
79. Albert M. Sacks, The Supreme Court, 1953 Term-Foreword, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 96
(1954); Griswold, 43 Mass. L. Q. at 100 (cited in note 41) ("After all, what does 'equal protection
of the law' mean if not equal protection?"); Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch:
The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 63 (Yale U., 1986) ('That there should be no
distinctions of race ordained by the state-that is a principle.").
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humiliating inferiority."80 Charles Black found the matter
"awkwardly simple." The Equal Protection Clause means that "the
Negro race, as such, is not to be significantly disadvantaged by the laws
of the states.... [S]egregration is a massive intentional disadvantaging
of the Negro race, as such, by state law."81 M.P. Golding felt neutral
principles only required (and Brown so held) that a "justification" was
necessary if race were used as a basis for drawing legal lines, and that
after Brown no justification would suffice for segregated schools in
light of the harm caused: "it generates a feeling of inferiority in the
minority group, i.e., the group not politically dominant." 2 These
scholars plainly saw the result in Brown as following from a principle
that forbade racial discrimination imposed on a minority by a
dominant class.
Indeed, to the extent that Wechsler himself saw Brown as a
case about race, he too saw it in terms of the antisubordination
principle. The Brown Court did not claim to strike all racial lines in
legislation, Wechsler said, although he conceded subsequent per cu-
riams might have gone that far.83 Rather, the decision was limited to
80. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 57 (cited in note 79). Bickel continued:
"[W]hen the consequence beyond that is to foster in the whites, by authority of the state, self-
damaging and potentially violent feelings of racial superiority-feelings that, as Lincoln knew,
find easy transference from Negroes to other groups as their particular objects?" Id.
81. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L. J. 421,
421 (1960).
82. M. P. Golding, Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63 Colum. L. Rev.
35, 55 (1963).
83. The Warren Court's practice of deciding controversial cases with per curiam decisions
drew frequent complaints from the academy, both in and out of the Brown context. See, for
example, Sacks, 68 Harv. L. Rev. at 99 (cited in note 79) (There remains ... the problem [of the
summary opinion's] appropriate use, and, more specifically, whether the Court is extending the
use of the summary opinion to cases where fuller exposition of views is warranted."); Note,
Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice: A Critique, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 707 (1956) (criticizing the
Court's per curiam practice); Jerome A. Cohen, Reviews, 67 Yale L. J. 169 (1957) (reviewing
Bernard Schwartz, The Supreme Court (Ronald Press, 1957)); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme
Court, 1958 Term-Foreword. The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84 (1959)
(discussing the increase in per curiam opinions during the 1950s). Per curiams were a point of
particular frustration after Brown. Although the Brown Court had relied on the special nature
of education in prohibiting segregated schools, the Court subsequently issued per curiam
decisions citing only Brown that reversed state segregation in many other areas such as public
transportation, public beaches, and municipal golf courses. See Muir v. Louisville Park
Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (municipal amphitheaters); Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350
U.S. 879 (1955) (municipal golf courses); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (public
transportation); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (public
golf courses and parks); State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (athletic contests);
Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (restaurant in municipal airport); Johnson v.
Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (public facilities); Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (municipal
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education, and to the impact of segregation in education on the minor-
ity children. "[I]t seems to me," Wechsler said, that "[Brown] must
have rested on the view that racial segregation is, in principle, a
denial of equality to the minority against whom it is directed; that is,
the group is not dominant politically and, therefore, does not make
the choice involved. '"8 4  Wechsler could not accept this principle as
neutral, however, because he felt it made the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown turn impermissibly on legislative motive, or on the
feelings of the group subject to the discrimination.85
C. Substantive (Rather than Formal) Neutrality
Much more was at stake in the neutral principles debate than
the legitimacy of the Brown decision itself. For Wechsler and his
contemporaries, as for Professor Sherry, the problem of neutral
principles far transcended the immediate result in any given case. It
went to the very heart of the legal system's legitimacy. Context is
important here as well. The jurisprudential counterpart to the old-
guard progressive attack on the Lochner Court was the Legal Realist
movement. The Realists argued that legal doctrine was relatively
indeterminate, and that legal decisions were often as much the result
of the predilections of the judges who reached them, and of broader
social norms, as they were of any binding legal rules. 86 For most
auditorium). Professors Bickel and Wellington explained why the Supreme Court might engage
in the practice:
This is very possibly a feature, even if not always a deliberate one, of the Courts re-
sponse to today's controversy. The controversy has undoubtedly and understandably in-
creased the pressure for unity within the Court and placed a great premium on opinions
that speak for as many of the Justices as possible. Hence we get opinions which have
the vacuity characteristic of desperately negotiated documents. Moreover, the less an
opinion says, the less there may be in it for critics of the Court to seize upon for their
own purposes; and one wonders whether it is not for this reason also that opinions have,
of late, often said very little and have carried an air of assertion, as opposed to one of
deliberation and rational choice.
Alexander M. Bickel and Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1957) (citations omitted).
84. Wechsler, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 33 (cited in note 18).
85. Gary Peller elaborates on this point, arguing that a legal process scholar such as
Professor Wechsler could not have accepted that law depended upon the subjective view of the
oppressed racial minority without unraveling the distinction between objective law and subjec-
tive politics upon which the entire legal process response to realism depended. See Gary Peller,
Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 561, 617 (1988).
86. See Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law at 198-208 (cited in note 18)
(discussing Realist attacks on legal formalism); Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence at
131 (cited in note 18). Of course, as these and others are quick to point out, Legal Realism was
about much more than this. See, for example, id. at 66; Eugene V. Rostow, American Legal
Realism and the Sense of Profession, 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 123, 131 (1962).
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Realists this insight simply implied the need to understand the
broader social forces at work.87 But for Wechsler's generation, the
Realist argument about the indeterminacy of doctrine threatened the
citadel of law altogether.
In response to the Legal Realists, there emerged a school of
thought called "Legal Process."8 8  Professor Wechsler stood at the
center of that school along with his sometime colleagues and collabo-
rators Professors Albert Sacks and Henry Hart. Legal Process schol-
ars generally recognized the difficulty of taming substantive law, but
they did not infer from that difficulty that determinacy was impossi-
ble in the legal system. Rather, the answer was a shift in focus from
the substance of law to the process by which it was made: "[a]t the
level of 'process,'... neutral, apolitical, reasoned-that is, le-
gal-discourse was still possible .... 89
Within this framework, it was essential for the Legal Process
scholars to distinguish the work of law courts from that of the
political branches, and their basis for doing so was "reasoned
87. Rostow, 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. at 131 (cited in note 86) ("What they were trying to
achieve was an awareness of the relationship between rules and policy... ").
88. Neil Duxbury concludes that process jurisprudence actually developed in the 1950s "as
a critical analysis of specific Warren Court initiatives." Duxbury, Patterns of American
Jurisprudence at 237 (cited in note 18). It is certainly true that the Legal Process scholars
never accounted adequately even for Brown. Thus Akhil Amar observes in his penetrating
review of the third edition of Hart and Wechsler's legendary federal jurisdiction book: "Brown
called into question every central tenet of the legal process theory embodied in the first edition
of The Federal Courts and the Federal System." Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 Harv. L. Rev.
688, 703 (1989) (reviewing Paul M. Bator, et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and
the Federal System (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 1988)). Similarly, Anthony Sebok notes what
likely was a backhanded challenge to Brown in the equally famous Hart and Sacks Legal
Process materials:
It is hard not to imagine that Hart and Sacks are addressing the specter of Brown v.
Board of Education when they state that "[t]he present question is whether the enthusi-
asts for adjudication as a method of settling every kind of social problem may not be
open to the charge of trying to make a similarly parasitic use of the prestige of the
method."
Anthony J. Sebok, Reading The Legal Process, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1571, 1587 n. 67 (1996) (citing
Howard Raiffa, In Memoriam: Albert M. Sacks, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1991)). See also
Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence at 266 (cited in note 18) (suggesting that Legal
Process scholars could not account for Brown because they never explicitly mentioned the case);
Gary Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at Century's End 36, 46-47
(New York U., 1995) (discussing the difficulty Legal Process scholars had with Brown).
89. Peller, 21 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 567 (cited in note 85). See also Sebok, 94 Mich. L. Rev.
at 1575-79 (cited in note 88) (reviewing the development of Legal Process through the publish-
ing of Hart and Sack's manuscript, The Legal Process). On the development of the Legal
Process School, see generally, Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism at 47-48 (cited in
note 50); Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements at 33-37 (cited in note 88); Horwitz, The
Transformation of American Law at 247-68 (cited in note 18).
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elaboration."90 Political theory of the time emphasized pluralism, the
struggle among groups for rewards from the political process. 91 In
this struggle the ad hoc was inevitable; power politics would have its
way. But the difference between courts of law and the political
branches was that law rested on the process of reason.92 As Neil
Duxbury explained, in the Legal Process school "[r]easoned
elaboration.., is integral to adjudication. It is in this way that
adjudication may be distinguished not only from legislation, but also
from other institutional activities within the legal process."93
This distinguishing of law decisions from naked power politics
was critical to the Legal Process scholars, for only then could they
sustain the legitimacy of judicial review. The heart of Wechsler's
argument was a requirement that the courts not "function as a naked
power organ."94 This same concern was at the core of Henry Hart's
own attack on the Warren Court, an attack anxious to avoid anything
really controversial, like Brown itself.95 "The time must come," Hart
insisted, "when it is understood again, inside the profession as well as
outside, that reason is the life of the law and not just votes for your
90. Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence at 260 (cited in note 18) ("Reasoned
elaboration, then, is integral to sound adjudication. It is in this way that adjudication may be
distinguished not only from legislation, but also from other institutional activities within the
legal process."). For a history of the development of the idea of reasoned elaboration prior to the
Warren Era, see G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential
Criticism and Social Change, 59 Va. L. Rev. 279 (1973).
91. See generally Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence at 244-45 (cited in note
18). The vision of pluralist politics open to all on an equal basis obviously came under attack
during the Warren Era. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Gary Peller, The New Public Law
Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 707, 738-39 (1991)
(stating that the intellectual consensus that the United States government was an open, plural-
ist democracy ended in the late 1950s). It is somewhat ironic that given the Legal Process
school's foundation in a rapidly-outdated view of politics, and its failure to account for cases as
fundamental as Brown, see note 88, it is nonetheless seen as the precursor of many present day
schools of legal scholarship. See generally, Edward L. Rubin, Commentary, The New Legal
Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev.
1393 (1996) (stating that the last unified approach in legal scholarship was the Legal Process
theory).
92. Although Legal Process was not just about courts, judicial review was a central pro-
ject. In his review of Hart and Sacks's Legal Process materials, recently edited and published
by William Eskridge and Philip Frickey, Tony Sebok argues that "fa]lthough Hart and Sacks are
explicitly not court-centered, their book is implicitly but aggressively 'adjudication-centered.'"
Sebok, 94 Mich. L. Rev. at 1579 (cited in note 88).
93. Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15
Cardozo L. Rev. 601, 663 (1993) (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal
Process: The Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 665 (Cambridge, tentative
ed. 1958).
94. Wechsler, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 19 (cited in note 18).
95. Professor Hart argued that there simply was not time in the day for the Justices to




side."96  And the same distinction was the stated basis for Phillip
Kurland's challenge to judicial activism, which he argued "should be
rejected because the exercise of such naked power ignites a reply in
kind from those on whose domain the Court is poaching."97
While the Legal Process scholars focused on neutral rules and
rationales to ensure the legitimacy of decisions, the defenders of the
Warren Court were far more concerned with the substantive
correctness of decisions. Professor Sherry juxtaposes "formal"
neutrality of rules (such as colorblindness) with the "substantive"
neutrality of outcomes (such as racial equality). She argues that the
latter is a "deviation!' from the generally prevalent and universally
accepted idea of formal neutrality. The Warren Court's defenders,
however, saw things in just the opposite terms. For these scholars,
the question was not whether the decisions always rested on
principles that could be applied to every imaginable case, but whether
the consequences of the decisions were good. "Everyone is against sin
and for good argument," explained Martin Shapiro, a political
scientist with an interest in law. "However, this approach soon
blossoms into a broad attack on result-oriented jurisprudence, not
only in the sense of what happens to the particular litigants, but
[also] in terms of general social, political, and economic results."98
Wechsler's approach, to those critical of it, bore too much
similarity to the now bad old days of arid legal formalism. In an
impassioned speech, Eugene Rostow, the dean of the Yale Law School,
fairly spanked Wechsler and his cohort for their attack on the Court.
96. Id. at 125.
97. Kurland, 6 Utah L. Rev. at 466 (cited in note 43).
98. Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and
Neutral Priniciples, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 587, 591, 592 (1963). Even those who purported to go
along with Wechsler's insistence on neutral principles ultimately ended up questioning it.
Wechsler sought "a method of adjudication which is disinterested, reasoned, and comprehensive
of the full range of like constitutional issues," Pollak explained, and "[s]o stated, the profferred
creed is hard to resist, and few are likely to be counted in opposition." Pollack, 108 U. Pa. L.
Rev. at 32 (cited in note 75).
But Judge Pollak ended up quoting Myres McDougal:
The essence of a reasoned decision.. . is a disciplined appraisal of alternative choices of
immediate consequences in terms of preferred long-term effects, and not in either the
timid forswearing of concern for immediate consequences or in the quixotic search for
criteria of decision that transcend the work of men and values of metaphysical fantasy.
The reference of legal principles must be either to their internal-logical-arrangement
or to the external consequences of their application. It remains mysterious what criteria
for decision a "neutral" system could offer.
Id. at 34 (quoting Myres S. McDougal, Perspectives for an International Law of Human Dignity,
1959 Am. Soc. Inel L. Proceedings 107, 121 (1959)).
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"Professor Wechsler's lecture... represents a repudiation of all we
have learned about law since Holmes published his Common Law in
1881, and Roscoe Pound followed during the first decade of this
century with his pathbreaking pleas for a result-oriented, sociological
jurisprudence, rather than a mechanical one."99 And Martin Shapiro
remarked, "This search for legal standards which the Justices are to
discover by the process of collective legal reasoning is little more than
the lawyer's nostalgia for the legal Court and the legal modes of
discourse which prevailed before the advent of the political Court and
political modes of discourse."100
The critics' problem with neutral principles was that the
search for them masked the underlying values at stake in constitu-
tional adjudication. A preference for neutral principles could not
resolve these underlying value questions. For example, M.P. Golding,
who went along with Wechsler in theory, still concluded, "I fail to
grasp Professor Wechsler's position if it consists in the statement that
one ought to, or even can, supply 'neutral principles' for 'choosing'
between competing values."101 "[R]easons," Arthur S. Miller stressed,
"can be considered to be 'good' or 'bad,' 'valid' or 'invalid,' 'true' or
'false,' it seems to me, not in terms of themselves, but in terms of the
realization or nonrealization of a given set of values."10 2 In another
piece he and his co-author Ronald Howell, a political scientist,
stressed that "[tlo call for [an opinion] to be 'reasoned' means little, for
'reason' is a tool, not an end: the results of a process of 'reasoning'
depend entirely upon what premises (i.e., values) are used in that
process, just as the end product of Univac depends upon what is fed
into it." °3
To all of these scholars who questioned neutral principles, it
was the consequences of legal decisions that mattered, not the formal
neutrality of the decisional rules employed. This group was promi-
nent; it included in its number Professors Bickel and Shapiro,
Deutsch and Miller, Golding and Rostow. Ridiculing the neutralists,
Martin Shapiro stated:
In other words, [a judge's] chief concern should not be whether a given decision
will for the next twenty years facilitate or hinder the rise of the Negro to a po-
99. Rostow, 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. at 138 (cited in note 86).
100. Shapiro, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 594 (cited in note 98).
101. Golding, 63 Colum. L. Rev. at 48 (cited in note 82).
102. Arthur SelwynMiller, Notes on the Concept of the "Living" Constitution, 31 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 881, 904 (1963).
103. Arthur S. Miller and Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 661, 682 (1960).
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sition of equality; rather, it should be whether the standard of equality which
he enunciates today will in the next twenty years maintain him in the path of
logic and consistency or lead him to the temptation of irrationality.
10 4
Eugene Rostow, quoting Dean Pound, was equally blunt:
Law is not scientific for the sake of science. Being scientific as a means toward
an end, it must be judged by the results it achieves, not by the niceties of its
internal structure; it must be valued by the extent to which it meets its end,
not by the beauty of its logical processes or the strictness with which its rules
proceed from the dogmas it takes for its foundations.
105
As Professor Rostow explained, the Court's task had been "most im-
portant of all ... to make good the promises we made to our Negro
citizens almost a hundred years ago .... 106
Lest there be any question as to whether substantive outcomes
and formal rules were often in opposition, it was this very focus on re-
sults rather than on the neutral bases for reaching them that so trou-
bled the "neutralist" critics. Wearily, Phillip Kurland conceded that
"[m]easuring the desirability of the results decreed, most students of
the Court-even the 'nonactivists'-are inclined to approbation."'0 7
But he was critical of what he saw to be the unprincipled support for
those results:
[Tihe "liberal" element in the community... [is] in sympathy with the results
that the Court has reached. They do not care who makes the laws, or how, so
long as the laws are to their liking. The time to attack the Court, for them, is
when the Court is formulating the wrong rules. 08
Robert McCloskey challenged the entire turn from protection of eco-
nomic to personal rights as unprincipled: "So we are left with a judi-
cial policy which rejects supervision over economic matters and as-
serts supervision over 'personal rights'; and with a rationale, so far as
the written opinions go, that might support withdrawal from both
fields but does not adequately justify the discrimination between
104. Shapiro, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 592 (cited in note 98).
105. Rostow, 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. at 124 (cited in note 86) (quoting Roscoe Pound,
Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 605, 605 (1908)).
106. Id. at 143.
107. Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Terin-Foreword: "Equal in Origin and
Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 Harv. L. Rev.
143, 143 (1964).
108. Id. at 176.
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them."10 9 He thus found it to be "a common and just complaint that
the modern Court has so far failed to develop reasoned formulations
for many of its judgments in the personal-rights area."11
The "one-person, one-vote" standard of the reapportionment
decisions"L--singled out for applause because of its neutrality by
Professor Sherry'12-also came in for strident criticism from the
"neutral" scholars, despite wide popularity in the public at large. Of
Baker v. Carr,"1 Phillip Neal said, "[u]ntil the Supreme Court can
provide a more satisfying explanation of the authority and principles
by which courts decree reapportionment than it or the lower courts
have yet given, the case will better serve as an example of the role of
fiat in the exercise of judicial power."'114 The "one-person, one-vote"
principle came in for an especially strong hit from Professor
McCloskey:
Should the Court undertake a Lochneresque responsibility for defining the
substantive constitutional norm (e.g., "one man, one vote") and for determining
whether each departure from the norm is "rational" or "capricious'?...
It is hard to see how the process of balancing these complexities and
subtleties could be reduced to anything even resembling "an exercise of
reason," how could it reflect anything more than a subjective ipse dixit.115
Moreover, to the extent that a concern for neutrality interfered
with pursuit of the progress of the Warren Court's substantive
agenda, it was the very idea of neutrality that the Warren Court
defenders called into question. Professor Sherry, again, suggests that
when postmodern scholars attack the idea of neutrality, they deviate
from a norm that ostensibly stretches from the Enlightenment to the
present. But postmodern scholars may be doing nothing more than
taking a page from the Warren-era book.116  Perhaps the most
exuberant critic of neutrality was Arthur S. Miller, who frankly
scoffed at the idea of neutrality, and proposed a "[t]eleological
jurisprudence, one purposive in nature rather than 'impersonal' or
109. Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 34, 45.
110. Id. at 61.
111. See note 38 and accompanying text.
112. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 467 (cited in note 1).
113. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
114. Phillip C. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 S. Ct. Rev. 252, 327.
115. Robert G. McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term-Foreword The
Reapportionment Case, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 54, 73 (1962).
116. In addition to the Warren-Era articles, see also White, 59 Va. L. Rev. at 299 (cited in
note 90) (arguing that in the charged political climate of judicial egalitarianism the "Reasoned
Elaboration ideal of judicial performance is at least partially obsolete").
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'neutral.' ,,17 For Miller and Howell, neutrality was a myth, one long
ago exploded in almost every discipline other than law. For that
proposition they cited no lesser authorities than Plato, P.W.
Bridgman, Michael Polanyi, Karl Mannheim, Gunnar Myrdal, Leo
Strauss, Isaiah Berlin, and Reinhold Neibuhr. 118 Theirs was stand-
point epistemology, the social constructionism of the day: "when
[choices among values] are made, they are motivated not by neutral
principles or objective criteria but by the entire biography and hered-
ity of the individual making them." 9 Professors Miller and Howell
argued that judges should un-self-consciously eschew neutrality,
"taking sides.., so as to further the ideals of American democracy."'120
Judge Charles Clark, former Dean of the Yale Law School, and his
then-law clerk (and now Professor) David Trubek, echoed similar
themes. They felt that the idea of judicial objectivity was dangerous
both for creating the idea of infallibility in judges and for crippling
them from the exercise of creativity. 2' "These new concepts of judicial
objectivity, untempered by recognition of the limits of human knowl-
edge, all contribute to an illusion which hides the real machinery of
the judicial process from its observers and its participants."'' 22
Alexander Bickel, a transitional figure between the Legal
Process generation and the newer Warren Court scholars pursued a
somewhat intermediate course, stressing prudence along with
principle. Bickel was content to accept the role of neutral princi-
ples, 123 so long as insistence on them not be carried too far, a point
made crisply by the question of benevolent quotas. The problem of
benevolent quotas arose with regard to desegregating housing. Many
blacks moving into a neighborhood might cause the neighborhood to
"tip," with all the white residents fleeing. The question then was
whether in service of the broader goal of integration the government
could impose a quota limiting the number of black residents.124 "That
117. Miller and Howell, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 684 (cited in note 103).
118. Id. at 665.
119. Id. at 671.
120. Id. at 692.
121. Charles E. Clark and David M. Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and
Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 Yale L. J. 255, 270 (1961).
122. Id. at 269.
123. Bickel defined neutral principles as "an intellectually coherent statement of the reason
for a result which in like cases will produce a like result, whether or not it was immediately
agreeable or expedient." Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 59 (cited in note 79).
124. See generally Victor S. Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How. L. J. 30
(1960).
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there should be no distinctions of race ordained by the state-that is a
principle," said Bickel.12 5 But, he explained:
[lf judicial review is to remain a process of principled decision, it would seem
that it must here either impose upon the country a rigidly doctrinaire rule of
behavior which will appear almost ludicrous to anyone who has any sense of
the actualities of the situation,] ... or it must uphold the segregation of the
races by law.126
Bickel could not go down this road with Wechsler.127
For Bickel, the right solution was pragmatic rather than prin-
cipled.128 "No society, certainly not a large and heterogeneous one, can
fail in time to explode if it is deprived of the arts of compromise, if it
knows no ways of muddling through. No good society can be unprin-
cipled; and no viable society can be principle-ridden."129 Bickel con-
ceded that "our nation would be severely damaged" "if in the second
half of the twentieth century it believed that segregation of the races
was neither right nor wrong."130 But by the same token,
is it not equally clear-as the example of the benevolent quota may show-that
the problem of the association of the black and white races will not always
yield to principled resolution, that it must proceed through phases of compro-
mise and expedient muddling-through, or else fail of an effective and peaceable
outcome?1
31
125. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 63 (cited in note 79).
126. Id. at 63-64.
127. Id. at 64. He explained, "I believe Mr. Wechsler suggests something like such a con-
clusion, and the fact that he does so gives one much pause. Mr. Wechsler is not right." Id.
128. Alexander Bickel later tilted back toward principle, just as he tilted away from
broader support of the Warren Court program. See Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of
Progress at ch. 3 (cited in note 30) (The Web of Subjectivity). In The Supreme Court and the
Idea of Progress, Bickel held in greater esteem the need for reasoned and principled
decisionmaking, see, for example, id. at 81, 98, just as he apparently did Herbert Wechsler's
insistence on neutral principles. Id. at 81 n.*. "I have come to doubt," Bickel said, "the Court's
capacity to develop 'durable principles,' and to doubt, therefore, that judicial supremacy can
work and is tolerable in broad areas of social policy." Id. at 99. Nonetheless, Bickel continued
to understand the tension between principle and reason on the one hand, and reaching decisions
consistent with popular acceptance on the other hand. See, for example, id. at 97. See also note
150 and accompanying text (discussing Bickers agreement with Jan Deutsch). Either popular
frustration with the Warren Court or Bickers own disagreement with it apparently caused him
to come to favor reason over results. It is difficult to know which. On the one hand, Bickel was
harshly critical of the reapportionment decisions, although they were tremedously popular.
Compare id. at 35, with id. at 91. On the other hand, he was generally supportive of the Coures
innovations in the area of criminal procedure, id. at 32, although he realized that the body
politic had nearly repudiated those reforms. Id. at 93.
129. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 64 (cited in note 79).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 64-65.
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Calm minds of the time recognized the wisdom in Bickel's
observation that there was not always a principled answer immedi-
ately at hand, although his solution was not universally accepted.
Bickel's answer was for a court to use the "passive virtues," to duck
for a time questions too intractable to address, a position that led
Gerald Gunther to argue that Bickel was "100% insisten[t] on
principle, 20% of the time."132  But Bickel's broader understanding
was precisely that of Eugene Rostow, who argued:
[Tihe felt necessities of society have their impact, and the law emerges,
gnarled, asymmetrical, but very much alive-the product of a forest, not a
nursery garden, nor of the gardener's art.... I stress that the work of the
Court is a work in progress, and that the positions it takes today will not nec-
essarily be those it takes tomorrow.
1 33
Similarly, Anthony Lewis, the New York Times's able and widely
respected Supreme Court correspondent, took to task the "academic
critics" of the Court:
One may wholly agree with the academic critics that the judicial process must
be one of reason and principle and yet recognize that a court may reach a
proper result without at once being able to agree on a fully satisfying rationali-
zation. There are many areas of the law, especially of constitutional law, in
which it has taken years and decades for the Supreme Court to work out all
the implications of a doctrine. The new and emerging problems of today are as
difficult as any in the past, and fraught with the gravest social implications. Is
it not understandable if adequate articulation has to await a similarly slow,
painful, halting process? The Brown decision is an example.... The fact that
the opinion in the Brown decision was difficult to write, or that the desired
unanimity on the Court was hard to obtain behind a particular form of words,
or that all the implications were not foreseen-none shows that the decision
should have gone the other way .... 134
D. Public Opinion and Neutrality
The debate thus far is framed in stark terms between the
"neutrals" who attacked the Warren Court's departure from formal
neutrality, and the defenders who were more concerned with substan-
132. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues--A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1964).
133. Rostow, 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. at 142, 143 (cited in note 86).




tive outcomes. The discussion has called into question several of
Professor Sherry's historical assumptions. But the Warren-Era
debate did not end at this point. Scholars with a bent toward political
science tried to mediate the dispute between those who advocated a
frankly "political" role for the Court and those who worried that the
departure from "neutrality" would imperil it. That further debate
provides great insight into the importance of neutrality, making the
point that for the public at large, the outcomes of cases are as
important as the neutral reasoning supporting them.
The task of mediating the "neutral"/"political' dispute was
taken up by Martin Shapiro. Shapiro marveled at the distance
between the political scientist, who "is not aware that he has proposed
anything particularly startling or subversive" in suggesting the Court
is just another governmental body, and the lawyer, whose "interest
[is] in maintaining the health and prestige of the Supreme Court."135
"To those particularly concerned with the health of courts, it would
seem a black day indeed when this political vision of the Supreme
Court became the popularly accepted one. It is this feeling which has
given rise to the recent search for neutral principles and
constitutional standards."136
Shapiro reconciled the views by focusing on the Court's
position in the broader body politic and on the means of maintaining
respect for it. As for whether the political or the neutral view should
prevail on the merits, Shapiro's biting comments suggested his strong
affinity with the political camp. But matters did not end there.
"[P]olitics is the art of the possible." 137 "The decisive issues are those
related to the tag 'judicial modesty.' How strong is the Court? What
are the sources of its power? To what extent can it challenge other
agencies of government?" 138 So far as Shapiro was concerned, if the
Supreme Court was to advance its agenda rather than merely
announcing it, the support of lower courts and opinion leaders was
essential.139 "Actions may speak louder than words, but words do
speak and in one sense the Supreme Court's only action is words."140
Here Shapiro fell down squarely on the side of principle and reason.
"If the Court is to be successful as a political actor, it must have the
135. Shapiro, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 590 (cited in note 98). See generally Martin
Shapiro, Law and Politics in the Supreme Court: New Approaches to Political Jurisprudence
(Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).
136. Shapiro, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 590 (cited in note 98).
137. Id. at 601.
138. Id. at 598.
139. Id. at 599-600.
140. Id. at 603.
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authority and public acceptance which the principled, reasoned
opinion brings."''
Ultimately, for Shapiro, the question was one of "political
strategy": 142
To put it bluntly, the real problem is how the Supreme Court can pursue its
policy goals without violating those popular and professional expectations of
"neutrality" which are an important factor in our legal tradition and a
principal source of the Supreme Court's prestige. It is in these terms, not in
terms of the philosophic, jurisprudential, or historical correctness of the
concept of neutral principles, that the debate should now proceed.143
In looking beyond the moral propriety of judicial decisions and
focusing on the Supreme Court's legitimacy in the body politic,
Shapiro underscored a role for neutrality that is not so far from
Professor Sherry's own. While Professor Sherry maintains her
preference for neutrality within a broader Enlightenment framework,
she also defends it in far more pragmatic terms in terms of acceptance
by the general public of Supreme Court decisions. In a critical
passage that intermixes these two arguments, Professor Sherry
explains:
These fundamentals reflect our liberal attachment to individualism and formal
neutrality. Americans tend to believe that "playing fair" means making every-
one play by the same rules, and any deviation from this definition is immedi-
ately suspect. This is not to suggest that proponents of affirmative action are
necessarily wrong, just that they have the more challenging side of the argu-
ment. Within the Enlightenment tradition, the high moral ground seems to
belong to those who favor formal neutrality. Even though the simplest answer
is not always the best one, it is often the most marketable one.'"
Thus, Professor Sherry joins Shapiro in understanding that judicial
legitimacy rests on offering rationales for decisions that appear to
meet popular standards of neutrality.145
Martin Shapiro's analysis was taken a step further by Jan
Deutsch of the Yale Law School, who, at least insofar as the tenure of
Earl Warren was concerned, had the last significant word. Deutsch
began with confusion about how Shapiro, who plainly understood the
political nature of the Court, nonetheless came to express sympathy
141. Id.
142. Id. at 605.
143. Id. at 605-06.
144. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 481 (cited in note 1).
145. Shapiro, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 605 (cited in note 98).
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with the neutrals, who Deutsch (following Shapiro's own label of
"judicial modesty") called "the modest."146 "The crucial fact remains
that Shapiro characterizes as dangerously improper both the
reapportionment and segregation decisions. If this be the music of
political jurisprudence, the 'modest' ought to urge Shapiro to play
0n."147
The primary factor that separated Deutsch from those who
came before was his critical observation that the general public cares
not only about the reasoning of opinions, but about results.14 For this
reason, the "novelty" of decisions Kurland attacked was misplaced:
The "novel" element in recent segregation and criminal decisions can thus
largely be accounted for in terms of the relatively recent public (and judicial)
awareness of the extent to which the world of the poor and of the Negro differs
from that which the bulk of the public lives, and of the consequences entailed
by that disparity for the content of a meaningful constitutional guarantee of
"equal protection." 49
Similarly, Bickel went astray in thinking that the passive virtues
were necessarily a solution, for in the public eye, a decision to abstain
is indistinguishable from failure to render a decision.' 5°
According to Deutsch, the Supreme Court's challenge was to
reconcile "craft pressures and the needs of its symbolic role-the
complex and often conflicting demands for adherence to logic, to neu-
trality, and to experience that our society makes upon it."151 In this
regard, the reapportionment decisions take on a different light, even
conceding Shapiro's argument that "[the 'one man, one vote' slogan,
146. Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 169, 170 (1968) (citing Martin Shapiro,
Freedom of Speech: The Supreme Court and Judicial Review 108-11 (1966)).
147. Id. at 174.
148. Id. at 239. See also White, 59 Va. L. Rev. at 298 (cited in note 90) ("Legitimacy comes,
then, when the dialectical process reveals that the Court is generally perceived as having made
a 'right' decision, not necessarily one that is popular in an ephemeral, immediate sense, but one
that embodies values-equality and liberty conspicuous among them-that have over time
emerged as endemic to American civilization, at least as it is currently perceived.").
149. Deutsch, 20 Stan. L. Rev. at 226 (cited in note 146).
150. Deutsch explained that "public acceptance of the Court does not rest solely on
perceptions of adequately general decisions. That acceptance rests also, to a very considerable
degree, on a view of the Court as the guardian of our constitutional rights." Id. at 216.
Ironically, although Bickel later came down more in the neutrals' court than in that of the
Warren Court defenders, he nonetheless adhered to Deutsch's analysis in this regard. See
Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress at 96 (cited in note 30). Perhaps it was the
difficulty of achieving success in the area of desegregation and school prayer that turned
Bickers head, for as he recognized, "It]he effectiveness of the judgment universalized depends on
consent and administration." Id. at 91
151. Deutsch, 20 Stan. L. Rev. at 243 (cited in note 146).
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in equating the whole of democracy with majority-rule elections rep-
resents naive political philosophy, bad political theory, and no politi-
cal science."'152 Deutsch's point was that one-person, one-vote is a
standard easily administered by courts. The right question is
whether "the consequences of malapportionment were sufficiently
serious that greater injury would have been done to the Court's pres-
tige by a refusal to deal with them than by the public controversy that
application of that standard aroused."
153
Deutsch ultimately concluded that the place of the Supreme
Court in American government would be assured to the extent that
the justices of that Court continued to reflect broader societal values.
Where Shapiro went wrong, as did Robert Dahl in his famous study
Who Governs?, 54 was in focusing on "the process rather than the
actor, on the interactions within a given system rather than on the
component parts of that system."55 "[A]ny study of the distribution of
political power that does not include a detailed analysis of the origins
and content of the community agenda must be adjudged incom-
plete." 56 And as for the relationship between that agenda and the
Court?:
[I]f we are concerned about the day-by-day operation of the Court, about the
routine decision rather than the isolated, spectacular exception, the question
whether the Court will confine itself to those decisions the society regards as
legitimately within its authority can ultimately be answered only by examin-
ing the extent to which individual Justices have internalized the community
consensus that defines the Court's sphere of competence.
157
Thus, for Deutsch the essential concern was whether the views
of the justices actually mirrored those of the public. The public cares
not only about playing fair, but also about "being" fair. The public
tends to focus as much on the result of an opinion as on its form. A
public comfortable with judicial results will be comfortable with the
Court that rendered them. Judicial results are likely to be consistent
152. Id. at 172 (quoting Shapiro, Law and Politics in the Supreme Court at 250 (cited in
note 135)).
153. Id. at 249.
154. Robert Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (Yale U.,
1961).
155. Deutsch, 20 Stan. L. Rev. at 257 (cited in note 146).
156. Id. at 256.
157. Id. at 259.
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with public feelings to the extent the justices share the values of the
public at large. 158
Earl Warren left the Court soon after Deutsch wrote, although
the furor over the Warren Court's handiwork hardly died down. 159
Scholars sympathetic to the Warren Court agenda were, like John
Hart Ely,16o to be busily employed in justifying that agenda on sub-
stantive terms, and a decision in Roe v. Wade'6' in 1973 was to throw
the debate wide open again. 62 By this point, however, most of the
changes had been rung in the debate over "neutral" principles.163
III. NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Although some historians question "presentist" uses of his-
tory,164 the very fact that we treat history as an academic discipline
suggests that we believe history holds the possibility of helping us to
understand ourselves.165 History cannot tell us how to live the pre-
sent, but it may help us comprehend it.166 Professor Sherry's own en-
deavor to compare the reactions to the Rehnquist and Warren Courts
suggests that she sees some lesson in that comparison of the present
with the past.
It is no small irony that in history there is an ongoing debate
about objectivity and neutrality similar to the one Professor Sherry
158. See generally id. at 239.
159. See Wright, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at 769 (cited in note 46) (noting the many critics of the
Warren Court).
160. See Ely, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 769 (cited in note 74).
161. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
162. See Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism at 232 (cited in note 50)
(discussing criticism that followed Roe).
163. For an example of the continuing debate sounding similar themes compare Bickel, The
Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress at 96 (cited in note 30), with Wright, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at
at 775-85 (cited in note 46) (criticizing Bickel for coming to favor neutrality and principle over
results).
164. On the concern about presentism among historians, see Kalman, The Strange Career
of Legal Liberalism at 183-84 (cited in note 50).
165. R. G. Collingswood, The Idea of History 209, 315 (Oxford U., 1946) ("We study
history... in order to attain self-knowledge."). See also Eric H. Monkkonen, ed., Engaging the
Past: The Uses of History Across the Social Sciences (Duke U., 1994) (collecting essays detailing
the importance of history to the social sciences).
166. Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth About History 305
(Norton, 1994) (Teople want to make sense of their world, even if explanations are proved to be
necessarily partial."). See also id. at 3, 52; Arthur C. Danto, Narration and Knowledge 341
(Columbia U., 1985) (arguing that the past defines our present); Edward Hallett Carr, What Is
History? 69 (Knopf, 1972) ('To enable man to understand the society of the past and to increase
his mastery over the society of the present is the dual function of history.").
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observes in the law. 67 Some historians question the extent to which
the past can be "known" outside the perspective of the observer. 168 Yet
for all the fervor of that debate, many historians seem to agree that
one can do a better or worse job of coming to terms with what
happened in the past, and that the entire endeavor of history is not
worth the candle without some attempt, within the limits of knowing
and describing, at accuracy. 169  This retrospective suggests that
Professor Sherry's own message may rest on a historically inaccurate
understanding of the time of the Warren Court. To the extent that
this is correct, it may be that a more accurate understanding leads to
conclusions different from those drawn by Professor Sherry.
History suggests, first, that Brown was not necessarily prem-
ised upon the idea of colorblindness or understood that way. 70 This is
a lesson that bears heavily upon the present struggle over affirmative
action, as well as on Professor Sherry's assertions about it. Professor
Sherry recognizes, as did Herbert Wechsler, that Brown itself did not
"declare, as many wish it had, that the fourteenth amendment forbids
all racial lines in legislation."'' 7 Rather, as we have seen, many of the
academics commenting on Brown saw the case as resting on the
antisubordination principle: the evil in Brown flowed from the
imposition of segregation on a black minority by a dominant white
majority.172
167. See generally Keith Windschuttle, The Killing of History: How a Discipline is Being
Murdered by Literary Critics and Social Theorists (Macleay Press, 1996); Peter Novick, That
Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge
U., 1988); Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, Telling the Truth About History (cited in note 166).
168. For a discussion of the debate, see Novick, That Noble Dream (cited in note 167). For
a strongly-argued rebuttal, see Windschuttle, The Killing of History (cited in note 167). For a
reconciliation of both sides, arguing that the fullest understanding of historical events is one
that comprehends all perspectives, see Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, Telling the Truth About
History (cited in note 166).
169. See Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism at 182-83 (cited in note 50)
(describing how objectivity has receded as a problem for historians; many historians do not need
the "new language" of post-structuralism because although they understand that they will never
obtain objectivity, "they must do the best they can"); David Hackett Fischer, Historians'
Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (Harper & Row, 1970) (providing an elaborate
logic for the study of history); Windschuttle, The Killing of History at 185 (cited in note 167)
("Without a claim to be pursuing truth, writing history would be indistinguishable in principle
from writing a novel about the past.").
170. See Part II.B.
171. Wechsler, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 32 (cited in note 18). See also Spann, 39 How. L. J. at
125 (cited in note 72) (arguing that Brown itself represents conflicting principles of color
blindness and affirmative action).
172. This, incidentally, is a neutral principle under both Professor Sherry's definition and
Wechsler's. Wechsler sought a principle that could decide a case whether the plaintiff was a
"Negro or a segregationist," a principle that transcended the case at hand. Wechsler, 73 Harv.
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Antisubordination is a neutral principle with very different
implications for the affirmative action question than the
colorblindness approach adopted by the current Supreme Court or
preferred by Professor Sherry. The current Court clearly has come
down against variable standards of scrutiny depending upon whether
or not the discrimination is benign.173 Remarkably, the majority
opinion in Adarand does not cite to Brown at all. At least for this
issue, the case Professor Sherry so admires seems to have receded
into irrelevance. But a view of Brown and the other decisions of the
Warren Court turning on the antisubordination principle might have
rendered a very different result in affirmative action cases. As
Professor Sherry herself wrote not so very long ago in applying this
neutral "antisubordination" standard: "Legislative schemes
discriminating against a nondisfavored class (affirmative action
quotas, for example) would ordinarily not be subject to heightened
scrutiny at all."174
Another lesson that history teaches is that for many who com-
mented on and admired the Warren Court, it was the substantive
results that mattered, not the formal neutrality of the decisions.75
The dispute along this fault line was sharp; the "neutrals" condemned
the very lack of formal neutrality while many others stressed the
"consequences" of decisions.176 Professor Sherry is correct in observing
that the battle in the days of the Warren Court was over race-
conscious laws that actually impeded equality or neutrality, rather
than over race-conscious laws that sought to promote it. For this
reason it is impossible to know how the defenders of the Warren
Court would necessarily have viewed affirmative action. From their
words, however, it is apparent that they did not have in mind the
empty idea of doing nothing to achieve race equality other than
prohibiting laws that employed explicit race discrimination against
minorities. It is not at all clear that the "trendlines" of the Warren
Court decisions, as Professor Sherry calls them, would not take us
L. Rev. at 12 (cited in note 18). This one does. That was precisely Bickel's point in his retort to
Wechsler. See Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 57-65 (cited in note 79).
173. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112 (rejecting the idea that benign racial discrimination
should receive a lower level of scrutiny).
174. Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context
Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 Geo. L. J. 89, 114-15 (1984).
175. See notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
176. Some stressed consequences while developing their own neutral principles, while
others did so while scoffing at the very idea of neutrality.
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directly to decisions such as Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke177 or Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC78 rather than to Adarand.
Yet history also teaches, and Professor Sherry takes the upper
hand here, that the idea of neutrality does have popular appeal.
Whether or not neutrality is attainable, there is a reason the subject
keeps coming back. Many of the things we learned in kindergarten
are too simple for the complex world in which we live. 179 But that does
not mean they lack popular or intuitive appeal. That is the lesson
Martin Shapiro was trying to teach. 80 It is true, for example, that
affirmative action has suffered most at the hands of those who think
that it unfairly discriminates against individuals, particularly indi-
viduals who have no direct connection with societal racism or its
effects.
But it is also true that how the public views judicial and other
governmental decisions is as much a function of agreement with the
outcomes as it is a function of agreement with the reasoning. This
was Jan Deutsch's insight.'8 ' The insight can be taken too far, of
course, as urging that whatever the public wants is what the Supreme
Court should give it.182 In its weaker sense, however, it is an insight
that deserves attention.
The general public possesses a very real ambivalence about
affirmative action, one that results not from a tension between results
and neutrality, but rather from a tension between what might be two
competing neutral principles. Professor Sherry is undoubtedly right
that some versions of affirmative action seem not to be "neutral" or
"evenhanded" to the general public. But the public also seems largely
inclined to concede not only past but also present racism-not only its
177. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
178. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
179. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 481 (cited in note 1) (explaining that her title derives from
Robert Fulghum, All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten: Uncommon Thoughts
on Common Things (Viflard Books, 1988)).
180. Shapiro, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 587 (cited in note 98).
181. Deutsch, 20 Stan. L. Rev. at 169 (cited in note 146).
182. There are scholars who question, at any rate, how often we can expect the Supreme
Court to render decisions contrary to public will. The genesis for this view was Robert Dahl's
path-breaking work. Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (U. of Chicago, 1956); Robert
Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J.
Pub. L. 279 (1957). Of more recent vintage, see generally Steven L. Winter, An UpsidelDown
View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1881 (1991) (observing that the law
can act only against a sedimented background that already bears normative intentions);
Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism (cited in note 50); Barry Friedman, Dialogue
and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577 (1993) (arguing against the countermajoritarian view
of the judicial system in favor of a theory based on interpretive dialogue).
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lingering effects, but also its present ones. 8 3 And the public seems to
see some justice in the principle that those who have been wronged
ought to be made whole.
Seen in these terms, it is possible to ask the "right" questions
about affirmative action, questions not about whether affirmative
action is "neutral" or not, but whether competing neutral principles
can be reconciled, whether racial equality can be advanced without
doing harm to other interests we hold dear. For example, there is a
very real question as to whether race-conscious remedies stigmatize
the very groups they are meant to assist. And there is the question of
whether reliance on race-conscious remedies impedes the ultimate
goal of race equality.
The Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions mirror deep
tensions in the body politic about affirmative action. The Supreme
Court has never obtained a majority on the question of affirmative
action or race-conscious remedies. Despite some appearance to the
contrary, even its last effort in Adarand missed the mark. In that
decision, a seeming majority of the Supreme Court held that racial
discrimination, benign and invidious alike, was to be subjected to the
same standard of strict scrutiny.8 4 But the "majority" carried only to
the extent that it was not inconsistent with Justice Scalia's separate
opinion, 85 and on the face of it, the differences between the two opin-
ions are significant.
183. See James 0. Goldsborough, The Art of the Possible, San Diego Union-Tribune B23
(Dec. 5, 1991) ("Affirmative action has been supported by every president since Lyndon
Johnson. ... [it] means a national commitment to help minorities lift themselves out of
prejudice and poverty"); John Leo, Endgame for Affirmative Action, U.S. News & World Report
18 (Mar. 13, 1995) ("[Wlhites generally are willing to spend money, perhaps funding affirmative
action programs based on need and class, rather than on race."); Roger Wilkins, The Case for
Affirmative Action: Racism has Its Privileges, The Nation 409 (Mar. 27, 1995) CAffirmative
action has done wonderful things for the United States .... It has not outlived its usefulness.");
D'Vera Cohn, Reality Check: Affirmative Action at Work, Wash. Post Al (Oct. 11, 1995) (quoting
46-year-old white male Dick Bushway: "There are a lot of [minority] people out there who want
to do good and, if given opportunities, can do good. Government has a role to play."). See id.
(reporting a survey of 1,970 randomly selected adults responding to discrimination, diversity,
and affirmative action in America and finding that 40% of whites polled called affirmative action
a good thing for the country compared to 68% of blacks); Fax Forum Results, Is Affirmative
Action Obsolete?, Training & Development 20 (Oct. 1995) (quoting a respondent of the survey:
"There is still a need for affirmative action. We just need to find a more effective way of
handling the situation."); Pamela Burdman, Boalt Host Lively, Civil CCRI Forum: Leaders on
Both Sides Face Student Questions, San Fran. Chronicle A21 (Oct. 11, 1996) (quoting Eileen
Hernandez, former EEOC official: "We are not a colorblind society.... We are very color-
conscious, and we always have been.").
184. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
185. Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (joining the
Court's opinion "except insofar as it may be inconsistent with the following...").
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The "majority" of the Supreme Court in Adarand, while taking
the hard line on the level of scrutiny, recognized that America has not
moved beyond the problem of race and held open the promise that
even race-conscious governmental remedies for that problem may still
be permissible186 The Court thus sought "to dispel the notion that
strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' "187 Time may well
tell that precious few race-conscious actions cross the barrier of strict
scrutiny, but it is too early to say for certain and the Court has left
the door open.
Although there is plenty of room for skepticism, it is possible
that the plurality opinion in Adarand offers a way of "muddling
through." The opinion warrants skepticism because Justice O'Connor,
who wrote Adarand, also wrote the decision in Croson that seemed
oddly unwilling to accept the obvious regarding past discrimination.18
If we are unwilling to accept past discrimination, we can hardly
remedy it. Moreover, too strict an insistence on limiting remedial
measures to entities themselves responsible for past discrimination is
both meaningless given the long history of discrimination and
unlikely to result in any remedy at all.189 Still, the "majority" opinion
in Adarand, in its formulation if not its application, seems to be ask-
ing some of the right questions.
In contrast, Justice Scalia seems not to be asking the right
questions, but to be in denial about them. Justice Scalia's image of
America is quite different, and with it his view of the law. For Justice
Scalia, "government can never have a 'compelling interest' in
discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial
discrimination in the opposite direction."190 That is because for
Justice Scalia
There can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race.... To
pursue the concept of racial entitlement--even for the most admirable and
186. The Court explained that the "unhappy persistence of both the practice and the
lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortu-
nate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response to it." Id. at 2117.
187. Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in
judgment)).
188. Croson, 488 U.S. at 469.
189. See Spann, 39 How. L. J. at 45 (cited in note 72) (stating that the Supreme Court may
view general societal discrimination as "too subtle and diffuse to be legally cognizable").




benign of purposes-is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of
thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege, and race hatred.191
Justice Scalia's vision is simply stated: "In the eyes of government,
we are just one race here. It is American."'192
It is not that surprising to see neutrality under attack when
the ideas expressed under the guise of neutrality are untenable ones.
Although Professor Sherry suggests that the postmodern scholars are
novel in their attack on neutrality, history also conclusively estab-
lishes that the attack on neutrality is not some recent concoction of a
small group of radical scholars. The work of Professors Miller and
Howell, of Professors Clark and Trubek, of Eugene Rostow, and per-
haps even of someone like Louis Pollak, is deeply skeptical of the idea
of objectivity or neutrality. These were not radical social con-
structionists, or maybe they were. But they were also deeply re-
spected teachers, leaders, and scholars.
The attack on neutrality Professor Sherry observes today may
arise from circumstances similar to those that motivated the attack
during the Warren era. In the face of a defense of Brown as non-neu-
tral, one response was to demonstrate its neutrality. But another, in
light of what seemed to many an unquestionably correct result, was to
question the very idea of neutrality itself. Right or wrong, for better
or worse, the public will question neutrality when it is the ostensible
basis for results that are difficult to accept. This may explain why
neutrality is again being questioned. The observation may be trite,
but when any group in society is consistently relegated to second-class
status under the guise of neutrality,193 it cannot be all that surprising
when members of the group challenge the idea of neutrality itself.
191. Id. at 2118-19.
192. Id. at 2119.
193. Neutrality is particularly likely to be seen as a guise when the Supreme Court seems
to change or manipulate the stated rules in affirmative action cases. See, for example, Spann,
39 How. L. J. at 45 (cited in note 72) (asserting that despite the rule that intent matters in race
cases, the Supreme Court in Adarand effectively refused to consider intent-in that case
benign-thus effectively equating affirmative action and discrimination, which are two very
different things).
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